The Atomism of the Vaisesika

     The epistemology of the Vaisesika differs only slightly from that of the Nyaya. The Vaisesika admits four kinds of valid knowledge: perception, inference, remembrance, and intuitive knowledge. The Vaisesika brings comparison under inference. The validity of scriptural statements is an inference from the authoritative nature of the speech in the Vedas. This is in contrast to the Nyaya.

     The Vaisesika accepts as categories not only things predicated in other things but also things capable of having things predicated in them. This is in contrast to Aristotle’s set of categories including predicates only. Of Aristotle’s ten categories, the last ten are predicates, while the first, substance, cannot be predicated of anything, not even itself. The Vaisesika adopts a sevenfold classification of the padarthas into substance, quality, activity (karma), generality, particularity, inherence, and non-existence. The Vaisesika initially turned its attention to characteristics that apply to things but soon turned its attention to the nature of beliefs. The first three categories have a real objective existence, and the rest are products of intellectual judgement.

     The Vasesika, contrasting itself to all idealisms, declares substance to be the first category. What we call being is really a collection of substances containing of different qualities. Unlike the Buddhist view, substance, for the Vaisesiksa, is really over and beyond quality. A distinction is made between corporeal and elemental substances. Earth, water, light, air, Akasa, time, space, and soul, and manas are the elemental substances intended to comprise all things. The Vaisesika is not a materialism, though realistic, as it admits non-material substances like souls. The Vaisesika theory of soul is almost identical to the Nyaya although it does not allow for a direct perception of the self. The existence of the soul is inferred from the fact that consciousness cannot be a product of the body, sense organs, or manas. The soul is maintained by the atman. The plurality of souls is inferred from differences in status and variety of conditions.

The Atomism of the Vaisesika

     All things originate from parts which are related to them by inherence. All things we experience are compound, while made up of parts. They are compound and thus non-eternal, while the parts they are made up of are eternal. Earth, water, fire, and air are both eternal and non-eternal, while akasa is only eternal. The limit of division is the atom, which is eternal, invisible, and indivisible. For if the atom were divisible, we would have to admit the paradoxical position that magnitude is built up from what has no magnitude. The atoms are the material causes of effects. Though they are supersensible, they can be classified, though not from the standpoint of size, shape, weight, and density. The qualities produced by the different types of atoms help with the classification of atoms. If we leave aside general properties of things such as impenetrability, which are perceived by more senses than one, the special qualities are odor, flavor, luminosity and temperature. It is said that there are four classes of paramanus, answering to the four classes of material objects: earth, water, fire, and air. These four classes produce the four senses of sight, touch, taste, and smell. The qualities of color, taste, smell and tangibility are to be found in the atoms themselves. The atoms are said to be globular, though it does not follow that they have parts. When three atoms are in juxtaposition, the middle one touches the atoms on the sides. The atoms are passive, and their movement is due to external impact. The qualities of things are due to the atoms of which they are composed. These atoms possess the five general qualities of all substances, as also those of priority and posteriority.

     The atomic theory of the Vaisesika is often alleged to owe inspiration to Greek thought and arose at a time when India was in contact with the Western world. In the present state of knowledge, it is difficult to say anything definite on this question. Apart, however, from the general conception of the atom as an imperceptible unit, there is practically nothing in common with the Greek and Indian versions of the atomic theory. According to Democritus, atoms have only quantitative differences and not qualitative ones. He believed that atoms are devoid of quality and divisibility, but differ in figure, size, weight, position, and arrangement. As a result, the qualitative differences in objects are reduced to quantitative ones. The Greek atomists developed a mechanical view of the universe, while the Vaisesika make God central to their system (see below), coloring the atomistic view of the Vaisesiksa with a spiritual tendency that is lacking in the Greek counterpart.

The Rest of the Categories and God

     While substance is capable of existing by itself, quality cannot, and abides in substance. Examples of qualities are color, taste, odor, touch, and sound. Karma is neither substance nor quality but is an independent category by itself. Generality is the property of something residing in many things. Particularity is when we regard it as distinguishing its object from others. There are different levels of generality and the highest is being, which includes all and is not included in anything. Inherence is the relationship subsisting among things that are inseparable, standing to one another in the relation of the container and the contained. Although originally not admitted as a category, non-existence was admitted when the Vaisesika enlarged its scope and attempted to give a coherent account of experience as a whole. Non-existence is the negation of identity.

     The original sutra by Kanada does not formally mention God; it traces the cause of the atoms and souls to adrsta. However, the followers of Kanada were unsatisfied with his description, and made them dependent on God. God is the efficient cause of the world, while the atoms are the material cause. The criticisms of the early schools were that the many atoms could not single-handedly produce the unity and variety of the world. Thus, they must be regulated by some presiding mind. God perceives the atoms and, in his intellect, arises duality and then the elements are formed. God then directs and operates the atoms in a continual process of construction and destruction. The world is thus destroyed and created anew in a continual cycle. There cannot be multiple gods, and so there is one God.

Back to Indian Philosophy