Samkhya

Note: fix special characters.

     The notions of prakrti and the gunas were first mentioned vaguely in the Vedas and then later on more explicitly in the Upanishads. First mentioned fully in the Svetasvatara Upanishad, elements of the Samkhya can be found in the katha Upanishad and the maitrayani Upanishad, among others. The svetasvatara Upanishad contains a developed account of prakrti and the gunas. The maitrayani Upanishad is familiar with the three gunas and the distinction between spirit and nature. In the Mahabharata of the epics, we see a development of Samkhya in full. It is easy to assume that the earliest Samkhya was a realistic theism. The Samkhya system is usually attributed to Kapila, who extrapolated and systematized the main doctrines from the Vedas, likely in the century preceding Buddha. The actual texts of the Samkhya, however, usually date to the AD period.

Doctrine

    The general notion of causation as seen in the west is that the cause precedes the effect- i.e., the effect cannot be seen as existing before it is produced by some cause. For if the effect existed in the cause, we could not explain how the activity of the efficient cause is necessary for the production of the effect, and moreover, if the effect were contained in the cause, it would follow that the effect is indistinguishable from the cause. The Samkhya repudiates this view and establishes the theory of satkaravada- i.e., that the effect exists in the material cause before it is produced. For if the effect did not exist in the cause no amount of effort could bring it into existence and the cause can only produce that effect of which it is materially related. Moreover, if the effect were not contained within the cause, any cause could produce any effect. These are some among multiple arguments in support of satkaravada.

    The Samkhya attempts to explain nature in terms of an ever-changing teleological substance- prakrti, and its modes, or attributes: the gunas. If an infinite regress is to be avoided, there must be an uncaused cause. From the principle of causality, it is deduced that the ultimate basis of the empirical universe is unmanifested prakrti. Prakrti is argued for on the following grounds: (1) since individual things are limited in magnitude, and limited things cannot be the source of the universe, they must be dependent on something more pervasive than themselves, (2) All things have certain common characteristics, thus implying a common source to which they were issued, (3) evolution implies a principle that cannot be equated with any one of its stages (4) the effect differs from the cause, and so we cannot say the world is its own cause, (5) there is a unity to the universe suggesting a single cause.  We cannot know the true nature of prakrti in its entirety since it is in part transcendent, but it exists as pure potentiality behind the world as we see it. The Samkhya has some resemblance to materialist theories, although prakrti is ultimately purposive while matter is unpurposive; samkhya approa-ches things metaphysically while materialism approaches things physically. Prakrti functions according its three modes: sattva, rajas, and tamas; these are not perceived but can be inferred from their effects. Sattva is represented by upward movement, and stands for pleasure. Rajas is represented by activity, and stands for pain. Tamas resists activity, and stands for indifference and sloth. The three gunas interact with one another, and all differences in the world are caused by different combinations of the gunas.

     Here we give the Samkhya psychology and theory of evolution.  purusa, or the soul, actually comes before prakrti and causes prakrti. The first product of prakrti is buddhi, which is the psychological part of the individual, and its attributes of knowledge, lordship, and equanimity, which is not to be confused with incorporeal purusa.  Buddhi, unlike purusa, is material and is regarded as the subtle substance of mental processes. As a material substance, buddhi operates under the three gunas; for example, its knowledge and freedom from desire is produced by sattva, its desires is produced by rajas, and its ignorance, negligence is produced by tamas. Ahamkara, or the principle of individuation, arises after buddhi. Ahamkara produces the manas, the five organs of perception and action, and the five fine elements. Manas is the organ which synthesizes the sense-data into precepts, suggests alternative courses of action, and carries out the will through the organs of action.  The five fine elements or tanmatras correspond to the five sense-organs and combine to form the five gross elements of ether, fire, water, air, and earth. The whole evolution from purusa to the five gross elements numbers twenty-five and is the ground through which the gunas operate.

     The Samkhya puts forward several arguments to establish the existence of purusas: (1) the aggregate of things must exist for the sake of another, (2) all objects have three gunas, so they must presuppose a self devoid of the gunas, (3) there must be a pure consciousness which coordinates all experience, (4) since prakrti is nonintelligent, there must be someone to experience the products of prakrti. Purusa is not the body and is different from buddhi but is what holds the consious states together. Purusa is static and is not subject to change, and is consciousness without feelings and emotions; it simply illuminates the world of thought and feeling. There are many purusas since different people have different physical, moral, and emotional levels, for example; the differences individuals can be seen as deriving from different effects of prakrti. Purusa is unrelated to prakrti and is a mere passive spectator; prakrti and purusa are opposed in nature- prakrti being nonconscious, active, and characterized by the three gunas, and purusa being conscious, inactive, and devoid of the three gunas. It is Buddhi that discriminates between purusa and prakrti. The ego is the conflation of buddhi and purusa, while feeling is the result of buddhi reflecting on the objective world with purusa the passive onlooker.

Theory of Knowledge, Future Life, and God

    The Samkhya accepts the three forms of knowledge of perception, inference, and scriptural testimony. The Samkhya accepts two types of perception: indeterminate and determinate. indeterminate perception is when one glances at an object without noticing its particular qualities, and determinate perception is when one takes a second look and consciously takes in all of its specific features of the object. Yogic perception is allowed in which one takes in objects of the past and future. Inference is said to be of two kinds: affirmative and negative. The Samkhya admits five-membered syllogism and restricted generalization. The Vedas are written in divine language and cannot be the work of persons; however, they cannot be inferred to be eternal. The Vedas, on account of the fact that they are not authored by people are free from doubts and discrepancies, and are regarded as having self-evident validity.  Although Samkhya admits there are other systems that profess to be revealed, reason will then have to be used to decide which is the correct source of revelation- the untruth of the other systems being due to them making unreasonable assertions which cannot be true.

     According to the Samkhya, the soul exists endlessly through both directions of time. The ligedaha, or subtle body, is what migrates through successive births, and ids composed of buddhi, ahamkara, the five tanmatras, and the gross elements, which serves as the basis through which the physical body grows. The subtle body retains the impressions from deeds performed in previous lives. The linga, or character, of the person creates misery when conjoined with purusa. The portion of linga deriving from the mother and father perishes at death. Although the Samkhya of the epics was theistic in nature, the classical Samkhya is atheistic in nature. Kapila regarded theism to be an extravagant claim- used to lure people into excessive contemplation of an eternal god and impede true discursive knowledge. The later thinkers of the Samkhya found it impossible to reconcile a theistic god and the acts of prakrti. For if God had selfish motives, then he would not be free and if he is free, then he would not involve himself in the act of creation. The eternal purusas are inconsistent with a creator god since if souls have a beginning, they need not be immortal.