Difference Between Greek and Hindu Philosophy

Posted on by leyoucis

The majority of Greek and Hindu philosophy was written during the late BC period during a time of extreme philosophical productivity. This was not the only period in which philosophical advancements were made, but it was probably the most productive in documented history. However, according to the traditionalist Coomaraswamy, Greek and Hindu metaphysics are to be conflated with each other in what is essentially the only possible metaphysics. What I am arguing is that there are structural dissimilarities between Greek and Hindu philosophy- the two being inverses of each other.

Coomaraswamy and Radhakrishnan

There are really two types of Indians, there are Coomaraswamy Indians and Radhakrishnan Indians. Radhakrishnan Indians attempt to distinguish Greek and Hindu metaphysics as much as possible and see the Indian metaphysics as resembling the closest that of modern idealism, while the Coomaraswamy Indians see Indian philosophy as essentially Greek- or do they see Greek philosophy as essentially Indian. Coomaraswamy was really building off of the work of two catholic philosophers: Rene Guenon and Julius Evola, who classify the work of the Indians as esoteric- to be grouped in the same category as Islam, Judaism, Catholicism, Buddhism, and Taoism. Coomaraswamy really must not have followed the same mold, and although his analysis of Hindu art should be labeled traditionalist, he must really be an ordinary Indologist equipped with the ordinary language movement. Thus Coomaraswamy is probably more popular with the Western audience, but in reality, Radhakrishnan is probably correct.

Difference Between Greek and Hindu Philosophy

Greek philosophy and Indian philosophy are really structurally distinctive entities- the two being inverses of each other. Indian philosophy is really around 70% esoteric and 30% philosophy, while Greek philosophy is 70% philosophy and 30% not esotericism, but spirituality, which is uses a looser epistemic framework in which to make transcendent claims. The reason that Indian philosophy should be considered esoteric is that the Indian philosophy is documented in a divine language with many indications pointing to the fact that it is describing a true facet of reality. This seems to be lacking in its Greek counterpart. But if you want to drop the esoteric-spiritual distinction, the fact is that Indian philosophy is mostly transcendent, while Greek philosophy is mostly transcendental. I didn’t say one was superior to the other, but one has to take his pick where his interests lie. Does he prefer transcendence or does he prefer the transcendental. Me personally, I believe I have philosophical talent and in fact the vast majority of what I was doing in my late teens and early twenties was philosophical metaphysics- the reconstruction of modern idealism- but my interests tend to lie in transcendence. So I didn’t say one was superior to the other, but the differ in this regard.

Defense of Greeks more transcendental nature

The presocratics are transcendental. The Ionian philosophers with all is fire and all is water and so forth- you can give arguments for that. Some of the Ionian philosophers posit non-elaborate cosmologies such as that the earth is flat and is surrounded by balls of fire- but this is a small amount of transcendence. The rest of the presocratics are transcendental. The sophists are rational in nature, the Pythagoreans with all is number- you can give arguments for that and the atomists are rational. Clearly, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle are more transcendental in nature. The stoics posit the metaphysical entities of fatalism and realistic pantheism but that is only two metaphysical entities, and you can give arguments for that. Further, it is well documented among professional philosophers that although stoicism is metaphysical in nature, the emphasis of stoicism and the vast majority of its thought is on ethics. Skepticism is clearly rational. Finally ancient Greek philosophy gets into the purely ethical theories of epicureanism and eclecticism. These are very transcendental in nature.

On the other hand, Indian philosophy is mostly transcendent in nature. The Naya creates the epistemic framework in which to make transcendent claims. The Vaisesika and Jainism posit a host of atoms that transcend reason. The Samkhya gets into the transcendent entities of sattva, rajas, and tamas. The Yoga deals mostly with the paranormal. Also, the Mimamsa deals mostly with the rituals of the Vedas. The Vedanta posits the transcendent entities of maya, jiva, karma, moksa, and future life. Finally, Buddhism and Jainism posit elaborate cosmologies with many transcendent entities.

Further structural differences between Greek and Hindu philosophy

many ordinary language philosophers would believe that Radhakrishnan and the people of the early nineteen hundreds were at a low point- they had inadequate knowledge of Greek philosophy and were simply reiterating what came in the past. From the perspective of metaphysical structuralism, Radhakrishnan had adequate knowledge of Greek philosophy and it was Coomaraswamy who made the error.

There are further structural differences between Greek and Hindu philosophy. Even at points were Indian philosophy and Greek philosophy seem to be identical, there are structural differences between the two. The atoms of the Greeks are quantitative, while the atoms of the Indians are qualitative and transcendent. Both the Greeks and the Indians posit categories, but the categories of the Indians are different from the categories of the Greeks. It is true that Plato posits a transcendent God and an eternal world but Plato’s god is fully transcendent; the idea of objective idealism, in which there is a transcendent god that contains the world in his consciousness is an Eastern conception that was invented by the Indians. And this has consequences of a peaceful and female centric society. I have Neoplatonism as an extension of Platonism. That is, Neoplatonism is essentially an epistemic idealism and the merging with God takes place fully within the person’s brain. And this merging with God has more to do with a feeling of closeness than with an increasing of intellectual capabilities. Finally, maya which seems on paper to be saying something similar to skepticism really has nothing to do with skepticism. Maya is a metaphysical claim and skepticism is an epistemological claim. If you can’t see the difference between maya and skepticism, look at the difference between cricket which is maya based and Greco-Roman wrestling which is skepticism based. Cricket and wrestling are really completely different sports from each other, and you can see through these sports the difference between these two entities.

Indian Philosophy

The Vedanta and Skepticism

Posted on by leyoucis

originally posted 7/31/22

It is important to note that the Vedanta shares more similarities with German and British idealism than it does with skepticism. Maya is to be interpreted as a positive metaphysical claim that shares structural similarities to that of German and British idealism. It is only under the false pretenses of the ordinary language movement that would conflate this with skepticism. Indeed, while the skeptic will not make a claim one way or another as to the illusionary nature of the world, the Vedantist will affirm the statement in the positive and continue to act in the world in a disorganized manner. The skeptic really leads himself to inaction, while the Vendantist continues to act in the world. Indeed, according to structuralism, the structure of a positive metaphysical claim always differs from that of an epistemological claim. To see another case to elucidate things, see Mctaggart’s denial of sense data. This not only refutes evolution and dinosaurs and so forth, but it also refutes things such as music if your willing to follow the argument. The skeptic will not make a claim one way or another whether evolution is true or not and will continue to enjoy music, since music is not metaphysical. The northern Europeans share more similarities with with the Vedanta, but it is up to the races who have more originality. So this is under the French structuralism which is hinted at in Radakrishnan’s work. The Vedanta actually shares more in common with traditionalism than they do with skepticism.

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The Advaita Vedanta of Samkara

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Samkara and Guadapada  

   Samkara, the writer of the Vedanta, was a Hindu philosopher eho lived between 788 and 820 AD. The advaita Vedanta is a reanalysis of the Upanishads. Samkara maintains that the Vedanta is simply a systematization of the Vedas. However, according to current analysis, it is a tricky issue whether the Vedanta is simply a systematization or an extension of the Vedas. Although the Upanishads is a disconnected document containing conflicting views, the Vedanta merges these views into a coherent whole. However, Samkara’s account of the Upanishads probably is closer to the original version than his predecessors. Many believe that the Vedanta with its Maya is simply a disguised form of subjective idealism of the Buddhist variety. Further it is held that Samkara adopted additional elements of Buddhism such as monasticism. However, Radakrishnan believes Maya goes beyond Buddhism. However, the Vedantist conception of moksa shares similarities with nirvana.

  Guadapada was the first expounder of the Advaita Vedanta and was supposedly the teacher of Samkara’s teacher and lived in the late seventh century and early eighth century. He discussed many of the central topics of the Vedanta. Guadapada lived during a time when Buddhism was very popular and so he incorporates many elements of Buddhism. In contrast to Samkara’s work, Guadapada argues that dream experiences are equivalent to waking experiences. Dream experiences, with their convoluted framework, do not fall short of reality, but simply do not meet the conventions of ordinary experience. They form a separate class of experiences but are coherent. Waking and dream states are equally real within their own conventional frameworks. Since waking experience is on par with dream experience, Samkara concludes waking experience is in a sense unreal. Two other predecessors of Samkara were Bharthrari and Bhartrprapanca.

Atman

     Samkara does not question the results of psychology and the sciences but asks what their presupposition is. The presence of the world implies there must be something which presupposes it that is a transcendent presence within oneself. This self is the Ātman. Like Descartes, Samkara finds self-certainty to be the foundation of the world. However, it is important to know that Ātman is really Brahman- i.e. all of reality. Samkara argues that the Ātman cannot be known directly since thought is part of the not-self that the Ātman presupposes. It escapes thought, but it does not entirely escape us. The self is both known and not known but is to be distinguished from both the world and thought. The self is not to be confused with consciousness since consciousness is subject to decay. The Ātman is “pure consciousness” or “mere awareness.” Descartes attempted to distinguish the self from the not-self and establish the former an existence in its own right. However, the world depends on Samkara’s Ātman, which is given a transcendent status.

Brahman

    Samkara upholds the ontological argument. The cases of the finite push for something infinite beyond it. He demands that reality requires something that does not need the support of anything else. However, Samkara does not uphold a list- as many theologians do- of attributes of God. Samkara also rejects the cosmological argument- which is in favor of a first great cause. Samkara regards the causal nature of a thing to be svabhava and the effect to be visesa. Brahman is the great svabhava with the world its visesa. It is thus foundational and not contained in any point in space. It is “nowhere and everywhere,” it “is not a cause,” and it “is inexpressible,” is “not finitely comprehensible,” has “no qualities,” and “is related to nothing else.” It is described in negative terms but contains a positive character- it is non-being, but that does not imply it is nothing. But it is not to be regarded as a “blank.” It is not, but we cannot say what it is. There are thus both a positive and a negative description of Brahman. The negative description is that Brahman is transcendent cause and the positive description is that Brahman is all of reality. Brahman and Ātman have the same characteristics and in fact, Ātman is Brahman.

. . .

Isvara

     Samkara does not believe in a personal God except as an ideal copy of Brahman- that is, a copy of Brahman as it appears to the individual put through the categories of time and causality which is practically useful. As said earlier, the cosmological argument falls through for Samkara. The idea of an absolute beginning- an uncaused cause- is self-contradictory. Similarly, the question of the problem of evil cannot be ascribed to a benevolent God, nor can we instantiate a dualism between God and Satan. Ascribing personality seems impossible for reason. Ultimately, no rational argument for God as a supreme being is acceptable. Brahman becomes Isvara when shaped by phenomenal forms. This phenomenal copy, when we think of it, brings Brahman closer to our understanding and our worship. Usually, Samkara does not draw a sharp distinction between Brahman and Isvara. Isvara’s personality combines the qualities of Brahman and Prakrti.

Maya and Avidya

    Samkara maintains that the precise relationship between Brahman and the world is transcendent since any attempt to explain the relationship applies finitary methods to something infinite. Thus, we cannot say that Brahman is the cause of the world. Nor can we say that Brahman manifests in itself or that it acts in the world. We cannot say that brahman transforms itself into the world either since if the whole is transformed into the world, then Brahman will become identical to the world and there is nothing transcendent in which we seek and if a part is transformed into the world, then Brahman can be partitioned making it not eternal. The word Maya registers this gap between appearance and reality. The illustration of Maya is the analogy of the rope and the snake. One sees a rope and mistakes it for a snake but we have no knowledge as to why this is so. We can say that Brahman appears as the world as the rope appears as the snake. Brahman does not depend for its existence on the world. The world is the vivarta, or perversion, of Brahman. vivarta thus signifies the way Brahman appears as the world of space and time. Another interpretation of Maya is that it is the “dividing force”, i.e. the “finitizing principle” that creates forms in the formless. As such it is neither identical to nor different from Brahman.

    Since Maya is deceptive in character, it is called avidya or false knowledge. Avidya is the subjective apparatus that causes life to turn into a dream. Avidya is that cognitive device that pluralizes the absolute into many appearances. The whole world is traced to avidya or false knowledge, but does this mean it is an illusion or a creation of the mind? The answer is no. Brahman is still what is real- which continues without change or transformation and is not affected by avidya. All of waking experience- being reduced to a dream- does not affect the reality of the whole. The “supreme reality of Brahman” is the basis of the world and there is to some extent reality in appearances. Avidya is not purely subjective but also contains an element of the objective. Maya and avidya really are the same thing except seen from different sides- avidya being seen from the subjective side and Maya being seen from the objective side.

Comparison with some Western views

    Samkara’s theory of knowledge comes the closest to Kant. Both assert a phenomenal world that wedges itself between us and the real world. Rather than positing a thing-in-itself, Samkara constitutes the illusion of the world within experience. The Vedanta can also be compared to that of Henry Bergson- which deals with a creative evolutionary process in man. However, Radhakrishnan argues that Samkara does not believe the growth of intellect forms a static sequence. Radhakrishnan thinks that the Vedanta shares the most similarity to that of Bradley’s relationless monism. For Samkara admits that the way we perceive things is not reality. However, unlike Bradley’s perspective of reality as being complete and perfect, Samkara stops at the inharmony of reality.

Ethical Behavior

   The final goal of the Vedanta is to obtain Brahman, which eventually creates happiness. As long as someone thinks he is an individual soul, a clinging to existence occurs- but when the person realizes he is all of reality, he stops being unhappy. We cannot often change the world with our bodies, but we can change the world with our minds. Good behavior helps achieve this end, and bad behavior does the opposite. The key insight of the Vedanta is a lack of egoism and a devotion to society. Vedic rituals are less important than the obtainment of salvation. To obtain Brahman, one should ease his desires. The virtues are tranquility, restraint, resignation, concentration, and progression in mind. Samkara retains belief in caste in a milder form. Two objections to Samkara’s ethics are considered. First, if the world is an illusion, why not engage in bad morals? The first objection goes away if we realize the world is not purely illusory. Second, if Brahman is all that exists, there is no motive for ethical behavior. That is, moral values are not ultimately real since it is not necessary to obtain Brahman. However, obtaining Brahman will help negate further negative behavior. Also, acting morally can help one realize Brahman; moral action in the world can help abolish avidya.

Jiva

     The jiva is the self as it exists with memories, ideas, and preferences and the Atman is the pure self. The object of self-consciousness is not the Atman but the jiva. The jiva is considered to be the same thing as the Atman- that is, it is the Atman conditioned by the object. It is conditioned by Buddhi, or the intellect. In addition to the jiva and the Atman, there is the organic body, the life organs, and the subtle body. There is also the saksin or the witnessing self.  The witness self helps maintain the identity of the individual in a series of mental ideas. It is difficult to determine the exact relationship between the jiva and the Atman. The Atman lies in the background and moves the jiva. This may seem unusual but it must be remembered that a motionless item can move something else such as a magnet and iron.

Moksa

    Moksa was available to individuals for all time. Moksa is not the “abolition” of the self but is the realization of its “infinity” and “absoluteness” by the “expansion and illumination of consciousness.” The form with which the world is experienced changes and there is a recognition of the oneness with Brahman. When one obtains Moksa, he becomes released. The world is not dissolved but a new state of mind is obtained. The plurality of appearances and the distinction of things disappears; One sees himself in all things. Appearances are somehow transmuted into another form and blended together. This merging into the absolute is in some sense beyond description. Moksa brings about pure happiness and the person can continue to live in the world, but his attachments go away. Samkara believes that Moksa is not consistent with work for the world since all activity presupposes plurality.

Karma and Future Life

    Samkara assumes karma. Karma is a force which accompanies a person’s moral actions and which can accumulate from lifetime to lifetime. Even when past deeds are resolved, new karma can accumulate. Moral life continually generates and regenerates until moksa is obtained which makes future birth impossible. When one gets rid of avidya, karma is removed. Actions done with expectations yield karma, while actions done for their own sake do not. However, the world is not deterministic determined solely by a person’s karma. A person is responsible for his own acts and karma only assists his behavior. Until moksa is obtained, people are bound up in the continual process of samsara and are born again and again. No new arguments were advanced by Samkara to defend future life. But when a person dies, a “seed” is left behind which creates a new organism. Samkara is against the materialistic view that the soul is just the body which dies when the latter is destroyed. The soul is independent of the body and must survive when the body is destroyed.

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Interests of Europeans in the Early 1900s

Posted on by leyoucis

Originally posted 4/8/22, Revised 6/14/22

     Philosophically, along with the newly developed logical positivism, British and Continental idealism as well as phenomenology were very popular. Early 1900s Europe was a period of spiritual experimentation, and the enlightenment had for the most part completely left (existing in a semi state throughout German idealism). The early 1900s had developments in not only the esoteric organizations but there was also an interest in alternative religions. Rather than the familiar Greek philosophy, they were more interested in philosophy from other continents. The general consensus is that there is uncharted philosophy from other continents, so it is a good idea to come to understand that philosophy. The early 1900s were still coming off of the heavy critiques of paganism from late antiquity, so rather than getting absorbed in this, it was considered much more tasteful for the spiritually adventurous to get absorbed in Indology, sinology, and Islamology. And European paganism (especially the Greek variant) and also Satanism have a very hard edge to them. It is true that Hinduism is pagan, but the pagan of the Hindus is much more relaxed than the European (especially the Greek) variants.

     The distinguishing feature of the European exposure to alternative religions was its trend (through Indology, sinology, and Islamology) to treat the religion exactly in the state it was developed in its philosophical state, treating alternative issues such as history and Western philosophy. This is in contrast to the esoteric approaches of the Americas and adoptions to popular audiences which was popular with American spirituality. Thus the three main trends among Europeans in the early 1900s were Indology, Islamology, and sinology. It is true that the English tend to the Indologists, the Germans tend to be the sinologists, and the Italians tended to be the Islamologists. Right in the middle of everything was France, which participated extensively in all three. And some of the greatest of these can be found among the French. However, Indology, for example, can be found in both Germany with, for example, Heinrich Zimmer, and in Italy with the works of Julius Evola (technically, Julius Evola located his work on Hinduism half way between the Indological approach and the esoteric approach). Also produced in the early 1900s were such juggernauts as the massive Romanian historian of religion Mircea Eliade.

The Atomism of the Vaisesika

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     The epistemology of the Vaisesika differs only slightly from that of the Nyaya. The Vaisesika admits four kinds of valid knowledge: perception, inference, remembrance, and intuitive knowledge. The Vaisesika brings comparison under inference. The validity of scriptural statements is an inference from the authoritative nature of the speech in the Vedas. This is in contrast to the Nyaya.

     The Vaisesika accepts as categories not only things predicated in other things but also things capable of having things predicated in them. This is in contrast to Aristotle’s set of categories including predicates only. Of Aristotle’s ten categories, the last ten are predicates, while the first, substance, cannot be predicated of anything, not even itself. The Vaisesika adopts a sevenfold classification of the padarthas into substance, quality, activity (karma), generality, particularity, inherence, and non-existence. The Vaisesika initially turned its attention to characteristics that apply to things but soon turned its attention to the nature of beliefs. The first three categories have a real objective existence, and the rest are products of intellectual judgement.

     The Vasesika, contrasting itself to all idealisms, declares substance to be the first category. What we call being is really a collection of substances containing of different qualities. Unlike the Buddhist view, substance, for the Vaisesiksa, is really over and beyond quality. A distinction is made between corporeal and elemental substances. Earth, water, light, air, Akasa, time, space, and soul, and manas are the elemental substances intended to comprise all things. The Vaisesika is not a materialism, though realistic, as it admits non-material substances like souls. The Vaisesika theory of soul is almost identical to the Nyaya although it does not allow for a direct perception of the self. The existence of the soul is inferred from the fact that consciousness cannot be a product of the body, sense organs, or manas. The soul is maintained by the atman. The plurality of souls is inferred from differences in status and variety of conditions.

The Atomism of the Vaisesika

     All things originate from parts which are related to them by inherence. All things we experience are compound, while made up of parts. They are compound and thus non-eternal, while the parts they are made up of are eternal. Earth, water, fire, and air are both eternal and non-eternal, while akasa is only eternal. The limit of division is the atom, which is eternal, invisible, and indivisible. For if the atom were divisible, we would have to admit the paradoxical position that magnitude is built up from what has no magnitude. The atoms are the material causes of effects. Though they are supersensible, they can be classified, though not from the standpoint of size, shape, weight, and density. The qualities produced by the different types of atoms help with the classification of atoms. If we leave aside general properties of things such as impenetrability, which are perceived by more senses than one, the special qualities are odor, flavor, luminosity and temperature. It is said that there are four classes of paramanus, answering to the four classes of material objects: earth, water, fire, and air. These four classes produce the four senses of sight, touch, taste, and smell. The qualities of color, taste, smell and tangibility are to be found in the atoms themselves. The atoms are said to be globular, though it does not follow that they have parts. When three atoms are in juxtaposition, the middle one touches the atoms on the sides. The atoms are passive, and their movement is due to external impact. The qualities of things are due to the atoms of which they are composed. These atoms possess the five general qualities of all substances, as also those of priority and posteriority.

     The atomic theory of the Vaisesika is often alleged to owe inspiration to Greek thought and arose at a time when India was in contact with the Western world. In the present state of knowledge, it is difficult to say anything definite on this question. Apart, however, from the general conception of the atom as an imperceptible unit, there is practically nothing in common with the Greek and Indian versions of the atomic theory. According to Democritus, atoms have only quantitative differences and not qualitative ones. He believed that atoms are devoid of quality and divisibility, but differ in figure, size, weight, position, and arrangement. As a result, the qualitative differences in objects are reduced to quantitative ones. The Greek atomists developed a mechanical view of the universe, while the Vaisesika make God central to their system (see below), coloring the atomistic view of the Vaisesiksa with a spiritual tendency that is lacking in the Greek counterpart.

The Rest of the Categories and God

     While substance is capable of existing by itself, quality cannot, and abides in substance. Examples of qualities are color, taste, odor, touch, and sound. Karma is neither substance nor quality but is an independent category by itself. Generality is the property of something residing in many things. Particularity is when we regard it as distinguishing its object from others. There are different levels of generality and the highest is being, which includes all and is not included in anything. Inherence is the relationship subsisting among things that are inseparable, standing to one another in the relation of the container and the contained. Although originally not admitted as a category, non-existence was admitted when the Vaisesika enlarged its scope and attempted to give a coherent account of experience as a whole. Non-existence is the negation of identity.

     The original sutra by Kanada does not formally mention God; it traces the cause of the atoms and souls to adrsta. However, the followers of Kanada were unsatisfied with his description, and made them dependent on God. God is the efficient cause of the world, while the atoms are the material cause. The criticisms of the early schools were that the many atoms could not single-handedly produce the unity and variety of the world. Thus, they must be regulated by some presiding mind. God perceives the atoms and, in his intellect, arises duality and then the elements are formed. God then directs and operates the atoms in a continual process of construction and destruction. The world is thus destroyed and created anew in a continual cycle. There cannot be multiple gods, and so there is one God.

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The Structure of the Jain Community: The Layman

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    The layman is to be considered a Jain, to the extent that he adopts a series of lay vows which mirror the various mental and physical vows adopted by the ascetic.  The five anuvratas or “lesser vows” parallel the five ascetic “great vows.” The first lesser-vow is nonviolence. While the ascetic is required to not engage in any acts of violence whatsoever, the layman simply try his best to not engage in any pointless destruction of lifeforms. The second lesser vow of truth appliers to the individuals social and business dealings and involves the necessary avoidance of sharp business practice such as willfully misrepresenting the qualities of the goods one is selling. The third lesser-vow of non-theft prohibits any form of stealing and is also extended by some contemporary writers to include such antisocial practices as avoiding to pay taxes. The fourth lesser-vow of chastity recognizes that although it should not be expected for the layman to be completely celibate like the monk he should restrict himself to one spouse and curb his sex-drive. The fifth lesser-vow of non-possessiveness states that rather than completely abandoning his possessions, the layman should not be over attached to his wealth and instead of hoarding it or glorying in it should live a simple life and dispose of any surplus money by religious giving.

Jain Business, Bidding, and Fasting

    The Jains are a merchant community that produced many financial juggernauts by the seventeenth century AD, including Santidas Jhaveri (died 1660) and Virji Vora (died 1675). By this time the Jain lay community had worked itself up as brokers and bankers. Indeed, by the nineteenth century, the Jains with their small population managed to own over half of the wealth of India. This monetary success is probably due to the fact that the metaphysical structure of the Jains, like idealistic protestant Christianity and reductionist Judaism, develops skills that promotes self-directed behavior. The Jains developed in the early modern period a custom to help them in business practices called the gaining of abru, a word signifying “prestige” or “reputation.” This abru tested whether a merchant was creditworthy and competent and when confirmed, generated further abru and still more credit and success. Reputation was based on publicly observable correct behavior, which included lack of scandal in private and commercial affairs, carefully regulated alliances, and active support of the religious sect to which one belonged. Abru was usually returned only on the basis of short-term behavior.

. . . Another activity the Jain lay community participate in is fasting, which is most commonly practiced in the Jain community by women except for holy days. The taking of a vow which involves some form of fasting is the most significant of a range of religious behavior adopted by a woman which will confirm the seriousness of her commitment and her near relatives toward Jainism. The physical restraint and control of the senses are the components the Jains believe to be most distinguished among women of their community.  As such, fasting, like bidding functions as a means of bringing out social prestige through the confirmation of moral purity of the woman and her family. Fasting usually occurs on days when the moon changes, three of these occurring each month, along with three further eight day periods that occur during the year. Fasting is also common during the four-month rainy season.

Puja

    Puja means in its broadest sense an act of devotion to a divinity by means of making an offering to a figure. Puja, for the Jains, takes place sometimes at home, where families make small domestic shrines, and can also be conducted at a temple with or without the aid of a ritual specialist. The most common type of puja is an act of “looking” at the image with mind directed toward the qualities that the image embodies. Only lay people can carry out dravya-puja, the type of puja in which the image is anointed with various types of substance (dravya). Ascetics are restricted to inner worship (bhavapuja) and merely contemplate the image without having any direct contact with it. This is due to the fact that touching the image causes impurity while their lack of possession means they can buy nothing in which to make the offering. The origin of puja in Jainism remains obscure and no doubt reflects a ritualism and puja found in Hinduism.

    The puja of eight substances is the only Jain ritual which has received extended scholarly description and interpretation. The eightfold puja is by no means standard and displays a general improvisatory character and there are a wide arrange of techniques available to the Jains. The eightfold puja usually takes place in the morning and should be performed in clean clothes. The image is first be cleaned of any accretions of the previous days worship and the anointed with a mixture of milk and water. Next the lay worshipper should apply a mixture of camphor and sandalwood, both expensive cooling substances, all to the main parts of the figures body, and the make an offering of flowers. One then withdraws from the figure and waves incense and lamps in the direction of the image, and the returns to the figure to offer three types of food substance, rice, sweets, and fruit. Finally, he completes the ritual by inward worship, contemplation of the image, and muttering of prayers and sacred formulae.

    The question is why perform puja? The objects of worship, the fordmakers, exist outside of human affairs and thus do not have an ability to respond to an act of worship. Devotion to fordmakers is sometimes described as bringing out a favorable rebirth and the activities of some present-day Jains would superficially suggest that the fordmakers indeed bestow some sort of blessing upon the devotee. However, ancient tradition, which has clearly informed current practice, discloses that worship of the fordmakers rather simply destroys karma and brings about inner spiritual purification of the worshiper. Thus, the prayers are designed to increase spiritual affinity and are not designed to promote worldly success such as luck in marriage, although certain sects of Jainism allow worldly requests to be directed at the images. There is no copy of the fordmaker located within the image and the image in no way serves as a mediator between the worshipper and the divinity.

Pilgrimage and Holy Places

    There are a large number of places throughout India which image-worshipping Jains consider to be sacred and of which journeying to them gives merit. Pilgrimage allows a Jain to become an ascetic for a short period of time and the method of pilgrimage has not changed much since the medieval period. Usually, a prominent layman will organize the event- although the original impetus will be from ascetics. There is no formal requirement for Jains to participate in pilgrimage, but it is a popular activity due to its religious and recreational value. The most important guide to Jain holy spots is the “Description of Various Holy Places,” written by the monk Jinaprabha Suri in the thirteenth/fourteenth century. Rather than being linked to the worship of images or relics, the Jain holy places are usually linked to some ancient ascetic or fordmaker, i.e., such as the place where they attained enlightenment or were born. For example, a Jain connection was claimed with the holy Hindu city, Benares, which was associated as the place of Parsva’s birth and came to be associated with several of the other early Jain careers. Although Benares is of little importance now to the Jain pilgrim, another Hindu holy spot, mount Abu, has been fully absorbed into Jain consciousness. The Jain minister Vimala (eleventh century) formed a desire to build a temple there but was not allowed by the local Hindu holy men. He then, through fasting, discovered that there was an image of Rsabha beside one of the Hindu temples and was hence allowed to build a new temple there.

   Outside the small market town of Palitana in Gujarat is Satrunjaya- one of the five holy mountains of Svetambara Jainism. The history of the mountain dates back to some of the earliest Jain texts, and probably dates to the 11th century, which marks the time when the hill was beginning to gain ground as a Jain holy spot. According to legend, Pundarika traveled to the spot and obtained final release there. A temple was then built there, and Rshaba ensured that it be regarded as the first of all holy places. A metaphysical atmosphere is associated with the holy mountain- with magical streams and wells, and animals are even said to give up their carnivorous ways and fast on the mountain. Spiritual attainments are said to be gained effortlessly on mount Satrunjaya. Sravana Belgola is a rural town of about ten thousand people situated in the southern state of Karnataka, between the cities of Mysore and Bangalore. The principal feature of the town is a small lake and two hills on either side, one named “Big Hill” and the other named “Little Hill.” At the summit of the big hill there lies a fifty-seven-feet-high figure of Bahubali- the first to become enlightened- which was built in 981 by a king. Every ten to fifteen years, the big hill is subject to a spectacular ceremony in which the head of the figure is anointed with various substances poured from 1008 pots of prominent members of the lay community.

The Shedding of Jain Karma as described in the Tattvartha Sutra

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     The Tarttvartha Sutra is a systematization of Jain philosophy as found in the Jaina Sutras written by the jain philosopher-monk Umasvati in the second century. It covers the ontology and cosmology of Jainism; it is accepted by both the Digambaras and the Svetembaras. Here we give as description of the shedding of Jain Karma taken from Chapter 9 of the Tattvartha Sutra. I am thinking about developing a spiritual variant of Jainism. Spirituality uses a looser epistemological framework in which to make transcendent metaphysical claims. This entails retaining the karmic atom found in Jainism but reinterpreting the behavior of the atoms. This may sound uncalled for, and even dangerous, given the frequent assurances of Jainism that it must be accepted exactly as it are handed down through history. However, I am not so sure. Indian religion took on a spiritual direction in the latter half of the AD period with Saiva, Sakta, and Vaisnava, for example. Therefore, it would make sense to continue in a spiritual direction. This spiritual variant would probably remain a Western religion of some sort. Really, I am for a retaining of old religions but slow forward progress, if any, into the new.

The Shedding of Jain Karma

     There are two types of karmic inflow: instantaneous and long-term. The Tattvartha sutra traces the stages of spiritual development starting with (1) a deluded world-view and transitioning into (2) an enlightened world view with and without restraint and laxity, (3) self-restraint without passions but with knowledge inhibition, and finally (5) complete knowledge of all things. At each stage of development, there are karmic inflow which are inhibited at the next stage. Inflow is inhibited by (1) guarding, (2) careful movement, (3) morality, (4) reflection, (5) conquering hardships, and (6) enlightened conduct. (1) means enlightened control of body, speech, and mind such as blocking the mouth to prevent injury to lifeforms. (2) means to move in a manner that is approved by monastic rules; for example, speaking correctly involves speaking words that are measured, controlled, and meaningful. (3) means acting in a way that involves right behavior. There are ten moral principles that Jainism advocates. For example, controlling anger and practicing tolerance in adverse situations (forgiveness), subduing pride about one’s individual circumstances (humility), sincere and honest intention (straightforwardness), and mortification of the body for the regeneration of the soul (austerity).

     (4) is the process of contemplating the Jain theory. There are twelve reflections that Jainism advocates and generally represent the basics of Jain theory. For example, reflection on the helplessness of the soul means reflecting on a world beset with miseries, misfortunes of birth, old age and death, etc. Reflecting on the on the otherness of the soul from the body means focusing on the intrinsic purity of the soul and the body as an insentient object. (5) is the twenty-two hardships that occur on the spiritual path and of which enduring them wears off karma.  These hardships are associated with different types of karma such as troubles in learning being associated with knowledge covering karma, loss of faith and lack of gain being associated with view-deluding and obstructive karma, and hunger, injury, and ailment being associated with sensation karma.  For (6), after one undergoes the twenty-two hardships, one undergoes the five stages of conduct: initiation, ordination, purification through service, self-restraint, and perfect conduct. The Tattvartha sutra also recommends external and internal austerities- e.g. reduced diet, lonely habituation, and mortification of the body, and scriptural study and meditation.

     There are four kinds of meditation: (1) mournful, (2) wrathful, (3) analytic, and (4) white. People at lower stages of spiritual development fall into mournful and wrathful meditation. (1) is to concentrate on getting rid of unpleasant feelings, removing contact with disagreeable objects, and increasing contact with agreeable objects. (2) is focusing on violence, falsehood, theft, and preservation of one’s possessions. Analytic and white meditation are practiced by many Westerners such as, for example, in the sciences. (3) is withdrawing into ones head and focusing on elements of Jain theory such as the scriptural commandments and the nature of karma while perhaps pacing around the room. The four varieties of (4) are (a) multiple contemplation, (b) unitary contemplation, (c) subtle infallible physical activity, and (d) irreversible stillness of the soul. In (a), the meditator, guided by scriptural contemplation, concentrates from different philosophical standpoint moving from any of the activities of body speech and mind to any of the others. In (b), the meditator focuses on a single entity and (c), all activities of body are absolutely stopped while one continues to engage in contemplation. In (d), irreversible stillness takes place, even the residual subtle activities while one continues to engage in contemplation.

The Samkhya System

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     The notions of prakrti and the gunas were first mentioned vaguely in the Vedas and then later on more explicitly in the Upanishads. First mentioned fully in the Svetasvatara Upanishad, elements of the Samkhya can be found in the katha Upanishad and the maitrayani Upanishad, among others. The svetasvatara Upanishad contains a developed account of prakrti and the gunas. The maitrayani Upanishad is familiar with the three gunas and the distinction between spirit and nature. In the Mahabharata of the epics, we see a development of Samkhya in full. It is easy to assume that the earliest Samkhya was a realistic theism. The Samkhya system is usually attributed to Kapila, who extrapolated and systematized the main doctrines from the Vedas, likely in the century preceding Buddha. The actual texts of the Samkhya, however, usually date to the AD period.

Doctrine

    The general notion of causation as seen in the west is that the cause precedes the effect- i.e., the effect cannot be seen as existing before it is produced by some cause. For if the effect existed in the cause, we could not explain how the activity of the efficient cause is necessary for the production of the effect, and moreover, if the effect were contained in the cause, it would follow that the effect is indistinguishable from the cause. The Samkhya repudiates this view and establishes the theory of satkaravada- i.e., that the effect exists in the material cause before it is produced. For if the effect did not exist in the cause no amount of effort could bring it into existence and the cause can only produce that effect of which it is materially related. Moreover, if the effect were not contained within the cause, any cause could produce any effect. These are some among multiple arguments in support of satkaravada.

    The Samkhya attempts to explain nature in terms of an ever-changing teleological substance- prakrti, and its modes, or attributes: the gunas. If an infinite regress is to be avoided, there must be an uncaused cause. From the principle of causality, it is deduced that the ultimate basis of the empirical universe is unmanifested prakrti. Prakrti is argued for on the following grounds: (1) since individual things are limited in magnitude, and limited things cannot be the source of the universe, they must be dependent on something more pervasive than themselves, (2) All things have certain common characteristics, thus implying a common source to which they were issued, (3) evolution implies a principle that cannot be equated with any one of its stages (4) the effect differs from the cause, and so we cannot say the world is its own cause, (5) there is a unity to the universe suggesting a single cause.  We cannot know the true nature of prakrti in its entirety since it is in part transcendent, but it exists as pure potentiality behind the world as we see it. The Samkhya has some resemblance to materialist theories, although prakrti is ultimately purposive while matter is unpurposive; samkhya approa-ches things metaphysically while materialism approaches things physically. Prakrti functions according its three modes: sattva, rajas, and tamas; these are not perceived but can be inferred from their effects. Sattva is represented by upward movement, and stands for pleasure. Rajas is represented by activity, and stands for pain. Tamas resists activity, and stands for indifference and sloth. The three gunas interact with one another, and all differences in the world are caused by different combinations of the gunas.

     Here we give the Samkhya psychology and theory of evolution.  purusa, or the soul, actually comes before prakrti and causes prakrti. The first product of prakrti is buddhi, which is the psychological part of the individual, and its attributes of knowledge, lordship, and equanimity, which is not to be confused with incorporeal purusa.  Buddhi, unlike purusa, is material and is regarded as the subtle substance of mental processes. As a material substance, buddhi operates under the three gunas; for example, its knowledge and freedom from desire is produced by sattva, its desires is produced by rajas, and its ignorance, negligence is produced by tamas. Ahamkara, or the principle of individuation, arises after buddhi. Ahamkara produces the manas, the five organs of perception and action, and the five fine elements. Manas is the organ which synthesizes the sense-data into precepts, suggests alternative courses of action, and carries out the will through the organs of action.  The five fine elements or tanmatras correspond to the five sense-organs and combine to form the five gross elements of ether, fire, water, air, and earth. The whole evolution from purusa to the five gross elements numbers twenty-five and is the ground through which the gunas operate.

     The Samkhya puts forward several arguments to establish the existence of purusas: (1) the aggregate of things must exist for the sake of another, (2) all objects have three gunas, so they must presuppose a self devoid of the gunas, (3) there must be a pure consciousness which coordinates all experience, (4) since prakrti is nonintelligent, there must be someone to experience the products of prakrti. Purusa is not the body and is different from buddhi but is what holds the consious states together. Purusa is static and is not subject to change, and is consciousness without feelings and emotions; it simply illuminates the world of thought and feeling. There are many purusas since different people have different physical, moral, and emotional levels, for example; the differences individuals can be seen as deriving from different effects of prakrti. Purusa is unrelated to prakrti and is a mere passive spectator; prakrti and purusa are opposed in nature- prakrti being nonconscious, active, and characterized by the three gunas, and purusa being conscious, inactive, and devoid of the three gunas. It is Buddhi that discriminates between purusa and prakrti. The ego is the conflation of buddhi and purusa, while feeling is the result of buddhi reflecting on the objective world with purusa the passive onlooker.

Theory of Knowledge, Future Life, and God

    The Samkhya accepts the three forms of knowledge of perception, inference, and scriptural testimony. The Samkhya accepts two types of perception: indeterminate and determinate. indeterminate perception is when one glances at an object without noticing its particular qualities, and determinate perception is when one takes a second look and consciously takes in all of its specific features of the object. Yogic perception is allowed in which one takes in objects of the past and future. Inference is said to be of two kinds: affirmative and negative. The Samkhya admits five-membered syllogism and restricted generalization. The Vedas are written in divine language and cannot be the work of persons; however, they cannot be inferred to be eternal. The Vedas, on account of the fact that they are not authored by people are free from doubts and discrepancies, and are regarded as having self-evident validity.  Although Samkhya admits there are other systems that profess to be revealed, reason will then have to be used to decide which is the correct source of revelation- the untruth of the other systems being due to them making unreasonable assertions which cannot be true.

     According to the Samkhya, the soul exists endlessly through both directions of time. The ligedaha, or subtle body, is what migrates through successive births, and ids composed of buddhi, ahamkara, the five tanmatras, and the gross elements, which serves as the basis through which the physical body grows. The subtle body retains the impressions from deeds performed in previous lives. The linga, or character, of the person creates misery when conjoined with purusa. The portion of linga deriving from the mother and father perishes at death. Although the Samkhya of the epics was theistic in nature, the classical Samkhya is atheistic in nature. Kapila regarded theism to be an extravagant claim- used to lure people into excessive contemplation of an eternal god and impede true discursive knowledge. The later thinkers of the Samkhya found it impossible to reconcile a theistic god and the acts of prakrti. For if God had selfish motives, then he would not be free and if he is free, then he would not involve himself in the act of creation. The eternal purusas are inconsistent with a creator god since if souls have a beginning, they need not be immortal.