Interests of Europeans in the Early 1900s

Posted on by leyoucis

Originally posted 4/8/22, Revised 6/14/22

     Philosophically, along with the newly developed logical positivism, British and Continental idealism as well as phenomenology were very popular. Early 1900s Europe was a period of spiritual experimentation, and the enlightenment had for the most part completely left (existing in a semi state throughout German idealism). The early 1900s had developments in not only the esoteric organizations but there was also an interest in alternative religions. Rather than the familiar Greek philosophy, they were more interested in philosophy from other continents. The general consensus is that there is uncharted philosophy from other continents, so it is a good idea to come to understand that philosophy. The early 1900s were still coming off of the heavy critiques of paganism from late antiquity, so rather than getting absorbed in this, it was considered much more tasteful for the spiritually adventurous to get absorbed in Indology, sinology, and Islamology. And European paganism (especially the Greek variant) and also Satanism have a very hard edge to them. It is true that Hinduism is pagan, but the pagan of the Hindus is much more relaxed than the European (especially the Greek) variants.

     The distinguishing feature of the European exposure to alternative religions was its trend (through Indology, sinology, and Islamology) to treat the religion exactly in the state it was developed in its philosophical state, treating alternative issues such as history and Western philosophy. This is in contrast to the esoteric approaches of the Americas and adoptions to popular audiences which was popular with American spirituality. Thus the three main trends among Europeans in the early 1900s were Indology, Islamology, and sinology. It is true that the English tend to the Indologists, the Germans tend to be the sinologists, and the Italians tended to be the Islamologists. Right in the middle of everything was France, which participated extensively in all three. And some of the greatest of these can be found among the French. However, Indology, for example, can be found in both Germany with, for example, Heinrich Zimmer, and in Italy with the works of Julius Evola (technically, Julius Evola located his work on Hinduism half way between the Indological approach and the esoteric approach). Also produced in the early 1900s were such juggernauts as the massive Romanian historian of religion Mircea Eliade.

Idealism and Cognition

Posted on by leyoucis

Originally published 4/8/22, Revised 6/15/22

     Idealism is a metaphysical doctrine that typically makes many ontological claims such as solipsism and free will. Solipsism is the belief that the individual is the only perception that exists and free will is the belief that the individual has the ability to act in a purely autonomous and spontaneous manner. What happened was the pragmatists and logical positivists came around and reduced the metaphysical claims of idealism to cognition. This means, for example, that the behaviors induced by solipsism are either seen as mental illness or are reduced to a cognitive maneuver. Under pragmatism, therefore, the claim will not be that he is the only perception that exists, but that one should act in a way as though he is the only perception that exists because it enhances your cognition in your maneuvering in the world.

Fichte’s Metaphysical Claim

     We now examine this in the case of one idealistic claim made by the German idealist Johann Fichte in the late 1700s. Fichte’s claim is that the I posits the world. When this is translated into a more common language, this is saying that the world is set up precisely for the individual- one of the most widely adopted metaphysical claims in the Western world over the last 400 years. This metaphysical claim, that the world is set up just for me- and this is really a metaphysical claim when it comes down to it- was responsible for most of the major advancements that took place over the last 300 years such as with, for example, all of the buildings that were made and technological advancements that occurred. What happened was that in the early 1900s, the pragmatists and logical positivists came around and switched this claim up from an ontological claim to a cognitive claim. What I am now arguing is that the ontological claim is stronger than the cognitive claim-making pragmatism more suited for the common man and Fichteanism more suited for the intellectual elite.

     What does Fichte mean by this. Does he mean the world is really set up for the individual- an ontological claim- or does he mean that this is simply a maxim for the individual to adopt- a cognitive claim. Fichte is generally considered to come between Kant an epistemologist- and Schelling who was an ontologist. The question is where to place Fichte, who is in between the two. It is my original analysis that Fichte is in fact to be regarded as an ontologist and not an epistemologist. But it is common among contemporary professionals to regard there as being two Fichtes- one who is making an ontological claim and one who is making an epistemological claim. Under the second interpretation, Fichte would not be considered to be a whole of a lot far off from the common man today. But the fundamental assumption behind continental philosophy is that people thought differently at different times in history

Idealism and Cognition in the Case of Fichte’s Claim

     It should be noted that Fichte sets up the sciences as contained within the posited world. The brain exists for the Fichtean with most of its features, and so the Fichtean does not fair as poorly when it comes to having a lack of brain as is initially thought. Fichte is in essence retaining the brain but splicing on some additional features such as free will and identicality of the intellect. Under the ontological variant, the world truly is posited by the mind, and the brain is embedding within the sciences within the world. In the cognitive variant, the brain exists as part of the world and the maxim is simply language in the mind.

     In order to figure out which claim is actually stronger- the cognitive claim or the ontological claim- we must analyze the situation under four cases- (1) the ontological case is true and one accepts the ontological case. (2) the ontological case is true and the person accepts the cognitive case, (3) the ontological case is false and one accepts the ontological case, (4) the ontological case is false and one accepts the cognitive case. (1) Let’s say the ontological case is true and one accepts the ontological case. Then every man on the planet is theoretically capable of having a high degree of success in the world subject to the amount of effort they are willing to put in. Thus any person accepting the ontological variant will be able to have a very high degree of success. (2) The person, in this case, will lose sight of the truth and perhaps give up after a while if he finds his cognitive assumption is not working since nothing is guaranteeing the cognitive assumption is ontological. Thus the person will miss out on the truth. (3) The person who assumes the ontological variant, in this case, will have a stronger sense of the claim assuming the ontological variant than the cognitive variant. Thus one’s cognitions will be further improved by viewing it as an actuality than a cognitive maneuver. However, there is the chance of oversight. (4) The person is not by nature designed to get anywhere in the world. the person will perhaps be slightly more successful using the cognitive maneuver. He will probably give up after a while.

     Finally, when it comes to neuroplasticity- only invented 5 to 10 years ago- the only thing I can say is that neuroplasticity does not have the same effect as the metaphysical claim. How does one make business deals using neuroplasticity? It is in reality a weaker variant as well than the rationalistic Fichteanism. Neuroplasticity helps with science but not with rationalistic maneuvers in the world. on top of that, the scientific claims invented using neuroplasticity do not have the same disjointed leaps of discovery that occur with Fichteanism. A good example would be Benjamin Franklin- born a decade before Fichte wrote his Wissenschaftslehre but acting in its spirit. Look at the disjointed leaps of thought that occurred through the use of Fichteanism. The fact is the same argument occurs comparing any rationalistic theory to any scientific theory. The scientific theory cannot be conflated with the rationalistic theory. Additionally, Fichte’s method is also a method of combating paganism. Also, the fact is that neuroplasticity comes into conflict with empirical tests of intelligence and so one is not in any better of a position following science. One must give a scientific antirealism and the power will shift into the hands of the rationalists.

Free Will: Compatibilism, Libertarianism, and Hard Determinism

Posted on by leyoucis

Originally posted 4/11/22, Revised 6/17/22

Free will is the belief that humans have the ability to act in a purely autonomous manner, unconstrained by external events. For example, when we are presented with a plate of meatballs, we generally have a sense that we have a choice in the decision of whether to eat it or not. The two main stances to take are compatibilism, and incompatibilism. Compatibilists believe that reductionism is correct but that free will is compatible with causal determinisms. Incompatibilists believe that causal determinism is incompatible with free will. There are two types of incompatibilits: hard determinists and libertarians. Libertarians believe that determinism is false and we have free will and hard determinists believe that determinism is true and we lack free will.  

     The ancient Greek philosophers are typically hard determinists and the modern idealists are typically libertarians. The typical ways of libertarianism is to appeal to something metaphysical. This is indeed where philosophers such as Descartes, Berkeley, and Fichte lie. The general consensus is that in Descartes’ substance dualism, there is no way of reconciling the way the brain interacts with the mind. Thus, the only option according to philosophers such as Fichte are hard determinism and idealism. Idealism gets the job done of preserving free will consistently but it comes at a price- the mind body interaction is changed. Thus, there is no way of knowing how food interacts with the body, for example. Thus, we have the familiar case of the person who is a healthy weight but is malnutritioned. This is actually considered a symptom of bipolar disorder and so bipolar can be seen as one potential symptom of idealism.

     So the basic account is that Southern Europeans tend to be hard determinists and northern Europeans tend to be libertarians- once you take recent developments such as compatibilism out of account. But the fact is that most people living in Italy as of present tend to be libertarians coming off of the modern period. There have recently been invented alternative accounts of libertarianism. These include event-causal libertarianism, agent-causal libertarianism, and noncausal-libertarianism. In my opinion these recently developed accounts don’t really make a whole lot of sense. Other ways of preserving free will are through the recently developed quantum mechanics. However, it must be remembered that quantum mechanics is ultimately an instrumental and not a realistic scientific theory. Under realistic interpretations, however, the arguments are at most heuristic.

The Atomism of the Vaisesika

Posted on by leyoucis

     The epistemology of the Vaisesika differs only slightly from that of the Nyaya. The Vaisesika admits four kinds of valid knowledge: perception, inference, remembrance, and intuitive knowledge. The Vaisesika brings comparison under inference. The validity of scriptural statements is an inference from the authoritative nature of the speech in the Vedas. This is in contrast to the Nyaya.

     The Vaisesika accepts as categories not only things predicated in other things but also things capable of having things predicated in them. This is in contrast to Aristotle’s set of categories including predicates only. Of Aristotle’s ten categories, the last ten are predicates, while the first, substance, cannot be predicated of anything, not even itself. The Vaisesika adopts a sevenfold classification of the padarthas into substance, quality, activity (karma), generality, particularity, inherence, and non-existence. The Vaisesika initially turned its attention to characteristics that apply to things but soon turned its attention to the nature of beliefs. The first three categories have a real objective existence, and the rest are products of intellectual judgement.

     The Vasesika, contrasting itself to all idealisms, declares substance to be the first category. What we call being is really a collection of substances containing of different qualities. Unlike the Buddhist view, substance, for the Vaisesiksa, is really over and beyond quality. A distinction is made between corporeal and elemental substances. Earth, water, light, air, Akasa, time, space, and soul, and manas are the elemental substances intended to comprise all things. The Vaisesika is not a materialism, though realistic, as it admits non-material substances like souls. The Vaisesika theory of soul is almost identical to the Nyaya although it does not allow for a direct perception of the self. The existence of the soul is inferred from the fact that consciousness cannot be a product of the body, sense organs, or manas. The soul is maintained by the atman. The plurality of souls is inferred from differences in status and variety of conditions.

The Atomism of the Vaisesika

     All things originate from parts which are related to them by inherence. All things we experience are compound, while made up of parts. They are compound and thus non-eternal, while the parts they are made up of are eternal. Earth, water, fire, and air are both eternal and non-eternal, while akasa is only eternal. The limit of division is the atom, which is eternal, invisible, and indivisible. For if the atom were divisible, we would have to admit the paradoxical position that magnitude is built up from what has no magnitude. The atoms are the material causes of effects. Though they are supersensible, they can be classified, though not from the standpoint of size, shape, weight, and density. The qualities produced by the different types of atoms help with the classification of atoms. If we leave aside general properties of things such as impenetrability, which are perceived by more senses than one, the special qualities are odor, flavor, luminosity and temperature. It is said that there are four classes of paramanus, answering to the four classes of material objects: earth, water, fire, and air. These four classes produce the four senses of sight, touch, taste, and smell. The qualities of color, taste, smell and tangibility are to be found in the atoms themselves. The atoms are said to be globular, though it does not follow that they have parts. When three atoms are in juxtaposition, the middle one touches the atoms on the sides. The atoms are passive, and their movement is due to external impact. The qualities of things are due to the atoms of which they are composed. These atoms possess the five general qualities of all substances, as also those of priority and posteriority.

     The atomic theory of the Vaisesika is often alleged to owe inspiration to Greek thought and arose at a time when India was in contact with the Western world. In the present state of knowledge, it is difficult to say anything definite on this question. Apart, however, from the general conception of the atom as an imperceptible unit, there is practically nothing in common with the Greek and Indian versions of the atomic theory. According to Democritus, atoms have only quantitative differences and not qualitative ones. He believed that atoms are devoid of quality and divisibility, but differ in figure, size, weight, position, and arrangement. As a result, the qualitative differences in objects are reduced to quantitative ones. The Greek atomists developed a mechanical view of the universe, while the Vaisesika make God central to their system (see below), coloring the atomistic view of the Vaisesiksa with a spiritual tendency that is lacking in the Greek counterpart.

The Rest of the Categories and God

     While substance is capable of existing by itself, quality cannot, and abides in substance. Examples of qualities are color, taste, odor, touch, and sound. Karma is neither substance nor quality but is an independent category by itself. Generality is the property of something residing in many things. Particularity is when we regard it as distinguishing its object from others. There are different levels of generality and the highest is being, which includes all and is not included in anything. Inherence is the relationship subsisting among things that are inseparable, standing to one another in the relation of the container and the contained. Although originally not admitted as a category, non-existence was admitted when the Vaisesika enlarged its scope and attempted to give a coherent account of experience as a whole. Non-existence is the negation of identity.

     The original sutra by Kanada does not formally mention God; it traces the cause of the atoms and souls to adrsta. However, the followers of Kanada were unsatisfied with his description, and made them dependent on God. God is the efficient cause of the world, while the atoms are the material cause. The criticisms of the early schools were that the many atoms could not single-handedly produce the unity and variety of the world. Thus, they must be regulated by some presiding mind. God perceives the atoms and, in his intellect, arises duality and then the elements are formed. God then directs and operates the atoms in a continual process of construction and destruction. The world is thus destroyed and created anew in a continual cycle. There cannot be multiple gods, and so there is one God.

Back to Indian Philosophy

Difference between Continental and Analytic Philosophy

Posted on by leyoucis

     What is the difference between analytic and continental philosophy? Other than epistemological differences, this really reduces down to scientific materialism vs metaphysics. I have religion labeled as an extension of continental philosophy since religion is essentially metaphysical in nature. Some of the different components of analytic philosophy are logical positivism, structuralism, philosophy of mind: functionalism, empirical psychology, realistic philosophy of science. Functionalism is really self-referential in nature. Logical positivism is the reduction of metaphysical claims to language, psychology, and the physical. I also place existentialism under analytic philosophy and not continental as it takes place purely through a reductionist lens. Post structuralism is not analytic philosophy but is an offshoot of analytic philosophy as it not only believes it is impossible to study nature through the structures of metaphysics, but also that it is impossible to study nature through the structures of science. Thus, it can be seen as a new form of skepticism.

Understanding of Metaphysics and Religion in America

     Really, we have been in a continual downward spiral as to our knowledge of what metaphysics is and how it works for about 100 years now, ever since the advent of logical positivism in the 1920s. The first thing to go was esotericism around perhaps in the 90s. There are very few Americans today who truly take the law of attraction seriously due to its being embedded into the sciences in the 90s, which I actually believe was an incorrect maneuver. But the law of attraction serves as an approximation as to the American mindset and I believe more Americans subscribe to the law of attraction today than they are letting be known. That being said, the only truly reductionist ages in American history of the last 100 years were the 80s and to a lesser extent the 50s. The 90s were in fact not reductionist, but nonreductionist as Jainism, the law of attraction, and British Idealism were very popular. The early nineteen hundreds were also nonreductionst with the advents of European Indology, Orientalism, Islamology, and the many esoteric organizations that began to surface: theosophy, spiritualism, new thought, anthroposophy, and traditionalism.

     One does not need religion in order to function- analytic philosophy suits that purpose. In fact, function is even in the name of functionalism- one of the components of analytic philosophy. However, many religious people will recognize that religion is something that is necessary in order to function correctly. For example, how does a person function correctly without free will? One may find that the alternative cognitions available through religion actually turn out to be more conducive to an enriched existence than reductionism. Religion can thus be seen as an existentialism substitute (even though existentialism was originally seen to be the religion substitute). For the American, religion is something one has to consciously engage in and take an interest in. For an alternative defense of religion, look to Averroes of the Middle East who regarded physical claims to be in the same ontological category as metaphysical claims.

An Interview with Salvador Dali

Posted on by leyoucis

     I recently came across an interview from the 1950s which was an American television interview with Salvador Dali- the early twentieth century surrealist painter. I am not aware of who the interviewer is, but every professional talk show host in America probably knows exactly who he is. This came at a time in the fifties when, although usually seen as a reductionist and Freudian age, Atkinson and Evola were in full swing. It is interesting to see what happens when two heavyweights of philosophy go at it. The guy giving the interview is a law of attraction person; there looks like there is a magnet literally coming out of his head and his teeth are pearly white. He actually gives a commercial for a cigarette company himself right on the talk show- unlike the commercial cuts that happen today- and his last sentence comes straight from the law of attraction- “pay the rich because we like to pay them.” Meanwhile, Dali is sporting and Evolianism: he only cares about himself- a solipsist. He mentions his girlfriend who he tried to win over- taking very unusual and eccentric steps to winning her over- absolute freedom. Finally, he actually mentions how the fifties are a Freudian age and how he is the only surrealist left and surrealism coming from its height a decade ago has collapsed into a mere nonentity- the oscillatory relationship.

     So, Dali is the Evolian, and the talk show host is a law of attraction person. Atkinson treats Evola with suspicion and Evola treats Atkinson with suspicion. And this really goes on into the 21st century. Atkinson has control over the West, and Evola has some degree of control over the East- Evola treats Atkinson with suspicion and Atkinson treats Evola with suspicion. No one really tries to assume a philosophical role anymore with the continuing unfolding into reductionism. What was once obvious to the public has now become lost. What the public today often overlooks is that the four fundamental metaphysical principles layed down by Evola are in fact the basis behind that kind of eccentric mode of behavior found in so many southern Europeans throughout the 1900s. Many adopt a more watered down version of Evolianism than Dali. I will provide a link to the interview below.

Salvador Dali Interview with Mike Wallace (1958)

Back to British and Continental Idealism; back to New Thought; back to Traditionalism

Defense of Evola’s Oscillatory Relationship

Posted on by leyoucis

    Evola’s oscillatory relationship replaces prayer with wishing- a form of magic. However, Evola regards his oscillatory relationship to be a form of high magic, to be distinguished from graded lower forms of magic such as superstition.

     In relating the ensuing event to the wish at the very moment of the wish calls for a denial of the law of causality and goes beyond any potential planning on the individual’s part. For even though one could plan past this point and try as hard as he could to obtain the result, the chances that it would occur in the very moment of the wish could be very slim calling for a denial of the law of causality. For example, suppose one has just lost a tennis match to a 3.5 tennis player at the local country club at the age of 18 and then makes the wish that he will become a top ranked tennis player- and then it actually happens. Nothing at the moment of the wish would suggest that this is a genuine possibility- in this extreme hypothetical case. The chances could be 1%. Once it becomes true, it is only a 1 in 100 chance that the wish was not involved.  One thus, under this form of metaphysical realism gains a metaphysical intuition and attempts this again and if it happens again, he can assume it is working. What is really involved here is luck and Evola really gives a way of controlling luck. Luck means the exterior circumstances involved that are beyond one’s control. If there were no such thing as luck, this would seem to make less sense, although in actuality, it would still make sense. But once luck is involved, it is impossible to know at the moment of the wish whether he will be lucky or not without the wish. Evola was in fact working off of the I-Ching when he wrote the books.

Further considerations

     The law of causality still holds except at a singularity and so tables, maps, and so forth and other forms of discursive knowledge can still be used. However, Evola’s maneuver can still work even if it creates a hindrance to discursive reasoning. And this is what many people do not realize that a philosophy can still work even if it creates a disturbance to discursive reasoning. Many contemporary professionals deny that there is any amount of luck in an individual’s attempt at development and attempt to gain full control over the law of causality. However, this is really nonsense and denying luck if there is such thing as luck leads to as much of a cognitive error as affirming luck when there is no such thing as luck. What comes across as bizarre to the American pragmatist or realist sits real cozy to the European foundationalist and makes complete sense to the Chinese- the inventors of luck.

     Evola’s idea makes sense as a cognitive enhancer if even if claims to metaphysical realism are dismissed. The cognitive device found in many current self-help books was in fact invented by a metaphysical realist about 100 years ago and the original form of the claim was as a form of metaphysical realism. The cognitive version is that when you are at a low point, always believe you will be able to get to a high point again. Many cognitive devices found in self-help books were in fact invented by idealists- such as solipsism. What is the basis behind acting only for yourself and asserting yourself over others? – believing you are the only perception that exists. The metaphysical realism version of these claims has a harder edge, however, than the cognitive version. The realistic version is more akin to prayer and the individual truly believes that it is ontological that he will Get up when he is down and treats it as a real phenomenon.

Back to British and Continental Idealism; back to Traditionalism

The Structure of the Jain Community: The Layman

Posted on by leyoucis

    The layman is to be considered a Jain, to the extent that he adopts a series of lay vows which mirror the various mental and physical vows adopted by the ascetic.  The five anuvratas or “lesser vows” parallel the five ascetic “great vows.” The first lesser-vow is nonviolence. While the ascetic is required to not engage in any acts of violence whatsoever, the layman simply try his best to not engage in any pointless destruction of lifeforms. The second lesser vow of truth appliers to the individuals social and business dealings and involves the necessary avoidance of sharp business practice such as willfully misrepresenting the qualities of the goods one is selling. The third lesser-vow of non-theft prohibits any form of stealing and is also extended by some contemporary writers to include such antisocial practices as avoiding to pay taxes. The fourth lesser-vow of chastity recognizes that although it should not be expected for the layman to be completely celibate like the monk he should restrict himself to one spouse and curb his sex-drive. The fifth lesser-vow of non-possessiveness states that rather than completely abandoning his possessions, the layman should not be over attached to his wealth and instead of hoarding it or glorying in it should live a simple life and dispose of any surplus money by religious giving.

Jain Business, Bidding, and Fasting

    The Jains are a merchant community that produced many financial juggernauts by the seventeenth century AD, including Santidas Jhaveri (died 1660) and Virji Vora (died 1675). By this time the Jain lay community had worked itself up as brokers and bankers. Indeed, by the nineteenth century, the Jains with their small population managed to own over half of the wealth of India. This monetary success is probably due to the fact that the metaphysical structure of the Jains, like idealistic protestant Christianity and reductionist Judaism, develops skills that promotes self-directed behavior. The Jains developed in the early modern period a custom to help them in business practices called the gaining of abru, a word signifying “prestige” or “reputation.” This abru tested whether a merchant was creditworthy and competent and when confirmed, generated further abru and still more credit and success. Reputation was based on publicly observable correct behavior, which included lack of scandal in private and commercial affairs, carefully regulated alliances, and active support of the religious sect to which one belonged. Abru was usually returned only on the basis of short-term behavior.

. . . Another activity the Jain lay community participate in is fasting, which is most commonly practiced in the Jain community by women except for holy days. The taking of a vow which involves some form of fasting is the most significant of a range of religious behavior adopted by a woman which will confirm the seriousness of her commitment and her near relatives toward Jainism. The physical restraint and control of the senses are the components the Jains believe to be most distinguished among women of their community.  As such, fasting, like bidding functions as a means of bringing out social prestige through the confirmation of moral purity of the woman and her family. Fasting usually occurs on days when the moon changes, three of these occurring each month, along with three further eight day periods that occur during the year. Fasting is also common during the four-month rainy season.

Puja

    Puja means in its broadest sense an act of devotion to a divinity by means of making an offering to a figure. Puja, for the Jains, takes place sometimes at home, where families make small domestic shrines, and can also be conducted at a temple with or without the aid of a ritual specialist. The most common type of puja is an act of “looking” at the image with mind directed toward the qualities that the image embodies. Only lay people can carry out dravya-puja, the type of puja in which the image is anointed with various types of substance (dravya). Ascetics are restricted to inner worship (bhavapuja) and merely contemplate the image without having any direct contact with it. This is due to the fact that touching the image causes impurity while their lack of possession means they can buy nothing in which to make the offering. The origin of puja in Jainism remains obscure and no doubt reflects a ritualism and puja found in Hinduism.

    The puja of eight substances is the only Jain ritual which has received extended scholarly description and interpretation. The eightfold puja is by no means standard and displays a general improvisatory character and there are a wide arrange of techniques available to the Jains. The eightfold puja usually takes place in the morning and should be performed in clean clothes. The image is first be cleaned of any accretions of the previous days worship and the anointed with a mixture of milk and water. Next the lay worshipper should apply a mixture of camphor and sandalwood, both expensive cooling substances, all to the main parts of the figures body, and the make an offering of flowers. One then withdraws from the figure and waves incense and lamps in the direction of the image, and the returns to the figure to offer three types of food substance, rice, sweets, and fruit. Finally, he completes the ritual by inward worship, contemplation of the image, and muttering of prayers and sacred formulae.

    The question is why perform puja? The objects of worship, the fordmakers, exist outside of human affairs and thus do not have an ability to respond to an act of worship. Devotion to fordmakers is sometimes described as bringing out a favorable rebirth and the activities of some present-day Jains would superficially suggest that the fordmakers indeed bestow some sort of blessing upon the devotee. However, ancient tradition, which has clearly informed current practice, discloses that worship of the fordmakers rather simply destroys karma and brings about inner spiritual purification of the worshiper. Thus, the prayers are designed to increase spiritual affinity and are not designed to promote worldly success such as luck in marriage, although certain sects of Jainism allow worldly requests to be directed at the images. There is no copy of the fordmaker located within the image and the image in no way serves as a mediator between the worshipper and the divinity.

Pilgrimage and Holy Places

    There are a large number of places throughout India which image-worshipping Jains consider to be sacred and of which journeying to them gives merit. Pilgrimage allows a Jain to become an ascetic for a short period of time and the method of pilgrimage has not changed much since the medieval period. Usually, a prominent layman will organize the event- although the original impetus will be from ascetics. There is no formal requirement for Jains to participate in pilgrimage, but it is a popular activity due to its religious and recreational value. The most important guide to Jain holy spots is the “Description of Various Holy Places,” written by the monk Jinaprabha Suri in the thirteenth/fourteenth century. Rather than being linked to the worship of images or relics, the Jain holy places are usually linked to some ancient ascetic or fordmaker, i.e., such as the place where they attained enlightenment or were born. For example, a Jain connection was claimed with the holy Hindu city, Benares, which was associated as the place of Parsva’s birth and came to be associated with several of the other early Jain careers. Although Benares is of little importance now to the Jain pilgrim, another Hindu holy spot, mount Abu, has been fully absorbed into Jain consciousness. The Jain minister Vimala (eleventh century) formed a desire to build a temple there but was not allowed by the local Hindu holy men. He then, through fasting, discovered that there was an image of Rsabha beside one of the Hindu temples and was hence allowed to build a new temple there.

   Outside the small market town of Palitana in Gujarat is Satrunjaya- one of the five holy mountains of Svetambara Jainism. The history of the mountain dates back to some of the earliest Jain texts, and probably dates to the 11th century, which marks the time when the hill was beginning to gain ground as a Jain holy spot. According to legend, Pundarika traveled to the spot and obtained final release there. A temple was then built there, and Rshaba ensured that it be regarded as the first of all holy places. A metaphysical atmosphere is associated with the holy mountain- with magical streams and wells, and animals are even said to give up their carnivorous ways and fast on the mountain. Spiritual attainments are said to be gained effortlessly on mount Satrunjaya. Sravana Belgola is a rural town of about ten thousand people situated in the southern state of Karnataka, between the cities of Mysore and Bangalore. The principal feature of the town is a small lake and two hills on either side, one named “Big Hill” and the other named “Little Hill.” At the summit of the big hill there lies a fifty-seven-feet-high figure of Bahubali- the first to become enlightened- which was built in 981 by a king. Every ten to fifteen years, the big hill is subject to a spectacular ceremony in which the head of the figure is anointed with various substances poured from 1008 pots of prominent members of the lay community.