In Kenneth Wrinkler’s book Berkeley an Interpretation, Wrinkler lays out what he believes to be a new interpretation of Berkeley. There are two standard interpretations of Berkeley’s idealism. The first interpretation is that unperceived objects continue to exist when no one is there to see them because they continue to be held in place by God’s consciousness. This interpretation is sometimes augmented by the idea that God does not perceive as we do since he is perfect, and so they are held in place in his mind without willing. This is called the external-world interpretation. The other interpretation dispenses with external objects without putting anything in their place. Instead of viewing an unperceived table in a room as my idea, your idea, or God’s idea the phenomenalist replaces these statements with statements about the possible existence of the objects. This is the phenomenalist interpretation.1
Berkeley mentions in the notebooks the idea of the denial of blind agency which was not mentioned elsewhere in his writings but was a commonplace assumption among seventeenth century philosophers such as Descartes, Malebranche, and Locke. This is the assumption that judgement and volition are inseparable from perception. This idea of Berkeley’s is central to Wrinkler’s dismissal of the external world interpretation. Wrinkler makes the argument that in the Dialogues and the Principles, Berkeley does not abandon this principle, but simply takes it for granted.2
Berkeley’s semi-phenomenalism and objections
It may seem that in the external-world interpretation, God must perceive in the broader sense of perceiving not only the world but all possible worlds to accord with his omnipotence. However, this is inconsistent. Indeed, Wrinkler does not believe Berkeley offers support in the dialogues for the external-world interpretation. To move forward, Wrinkler advances his own interpretation that is half way between the phenomenalist and external-world interpretations. Wrinkler agrees with the external-world interpretation that objects exist if and only if God perceives them. But he adds that by the denial of blind agency, God perceives every idea only by his intention to cause it. Objects owe their existence to divine volitions, but those volitions do not matriculate apart from the individual’s perception. Thus, the texts usually offered on behalf of the external-world interpretation are consistent with thew phenomenalist interpretation once it has been supplemented by the denial of blind agency. The mistake of the external-world interpretation lies in supposing that God’s contribution to the perception of things is distinct from his volition. On Winkler’s interpretation, god perceives all things, but this perception is nothing more than the perception inevitably involved in his volition. God’s knowledge of things therefore derives entirely from acquaintance with his will.3
A standard objection is that divine ideas in Berkeley’s system are superfluous. It is right to assume that since Gods’ ideas are passive and inert, they can make no causal contribution to the reality of things. But despite all this, God’s ideas are not superfluous since without them, god would not only be unable to perceive, but unable to will.4 Two more objections are in order. The first objection is that Wrinkler’s interpretation still runs into contradiction with Berkeley’s statements on external objects. However, in view of the modifications to the phenomenalist interpretation and the rereading of passages on external objects, the inconsistency of this interpretation with Berkeley’s statements on external objects is reduced. The second objection is that outside of the notebooks, the derivation of Wrinkler’s interpretation cannot be found. For example, in certain passages, Berkeley passes up perfect opportunities to make use of the denial of blind agency. However, these passages do not necessarily create stumbling blocks for his interpretation. His interpretation does better than other interpretations in terms of consistency. The phenomenalist interpretation calls for supplementation. Indeed, Wrinkler’s interpretation creates the position of most coherence.5
Analysis
Although I like Wrinkler’s interpretation, perhaps it is best to go back to the traditional phenomenalist and external-world interpretations of Berkeley. The traditional reading of Berkeley attributes the phenomenalist interpretation to the Principles and the external-world interpretation to the Dialogues, these two interpretations being consistent, yet inconsistent with each other. I like the external-world interpretation. I think this interpretation has much less paradox in it than attributed to it by recent authors. For example, I do not believe that God must perceive not only the world but all possible worlds to accord with his omnipotence. That being said, I am fine with the phenomenalist interpretation. Berkeley is attempting to hold in place religious beliefs which is reinforced by his later Alciphron. One way to refute the problem of evil is to deny anything exists outside your immediate experience. This interpretation is supplemented by Wrinkler’s modification since the original interpretation can run into moral issues. Additionally, Berkeley means by his semi-phenomenalism the classic statement that we live in a dream. In following this doctrine, the world begins to loosen up and the colleges begin to function more properly again. However, Berkeley’s phenomenalism was different from and less developed than what came in later centuries.
Idealism Studies 