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. . . Thus an substance A can be shown to exist if there is a one-to-one corre-spondence with each term of such an infinite series such that if A has parts B and C (where the number of parts could finite or infinite), there is a sufficient description of B such that the sufficient description of B determines the suffi-cient description the part of B corresponding to C. For simplicity, we write B ! C for that part of B that corresponds to C and B ! C ! D for that part of B which corresponds to C which corresponds to D and so forth. A is called the primary whole, B, C, and D the primary parts, and B ! C, B ! D, C ! D, etc. the secondary parts. If the condition above is satisfied, it follows that the sufficient descrip-tions of the primary parts will determine the sufficient descriptions of the parts within A through an infinite series. For in B we will have B ! B and B ! C and in C we will have C ! B and C ! C, and these four parts of A will have parts corresponding to them in B and C. In B there will be B ! B ! B, B ! B ! C, B ! C ! B, and B ! C ! C and in C we will have C ! B ! B, C ! B ! C, C ! C ! B, and C ! C ! C, and these eight parts of A will have parts correspondent in B and C, and so on without end. We now give definitions of these terms. A relation between a part B and a part C is a relation of determining correspondence if the sufficient description of C, (1) intrinsically determines the part of B in question, B ! C, and (2) intrinsically determines each of the parts of B ! C, and so on to infini-ty. The differentiating group of a primary part B consists of those primary parts and secondary parts to which B corresponds.
Matter is defined by McTaggart to be that which contains the primary qualities, i.e. size, shape, position, impenetrability. McTaggart now asks what the primary parts of matter are and sees whether these divided into parts of parts to infinity by determining correspondence. The primary parts cannot be composed of nonspatial qualities alone since no such correspondence can determine sufficient descriptions of secondary parts. For example if you describe one primary part sufficiently as red and one primary part sufficiently as blue, then there would no way to compare the red and blue parts using these qualities alone. Let us then attempt to account for a piece of matter A in terms of its spatial qualities and nonspatial qualities. Matter cannot be made up of a set of indivisible points since these points would themselves be pieces of matter which would not be infinitely divisible. Thus we must divide space into a collection of divisible areas. There are two ways to distinguish spatial part from others. The first way is to describe qualities of that part which are not shared by any part in spatial contact with that part such as by saying that it is red and everything in contact with it is blue. The second is list a set of parts of that part such as listing the counties of England on a map, which leads to the same conception as the first way. Thus the nonspatial qualities of the spatial parts must be determined by determining correspondence since there would to be (an infinite number of coincidences between the determination of spatial qualities and the determination of nonspatial qualities), and this was shown in the first paragraph to lead to a unresolvable infinite regress. But this is impossible since . . .
McTaggart’s system is therefore appropriately titled a spiritualism in which all that exists is spirit (show that spirit, unlike matter and sensa has parts within parts to infinity determined by determining correspondence). Spirit is defined to be the substance having as quality the content all of which is one or more selves. McTaggart views it as unprovable that we perceive other selves directly but takes it as a positive claim in his system. For very often we perceive ourselves without being aware of it and this argument generalizes to other selves. The sensorial perceptions of others are simply indirect manifestations of a direct perception. . . . Let A be a group of selves and suppose B and C are parts of A such that XYZ is a sufficient description of C and UVW of a sufficient description of B. Define a relation B ! C by letting B ! C mean “the perception of the only self that is XYZ by the only self that is UVW.” We show that this is a relation of determining correspondence. Then the sufficient description of C intrinsically determines B ! C since XYZ will include the fact that B perceives C. . . . .Thus the primary parts in this system are selves and the secondary parts are their perceptions of each other. The selves in any individual self’s differentiating group are only those selves that that self perceives directly, and it is possible that will be all the selves in the universe. These selves are perceived directly by each other by way of double mediation and only apparently perceived indirectly.
These selves are bound by love. McTaggart defines love as an intense pas-sion or liking, and McTaggart sees love as the key emotion. Love should not be associated with a pleasure, as love often arises without any such pleasure. That conclusion according to McTaggart ultimately rests on the incorrect hy-pothesis of psychological hedonism. Love is thus simply a bond between selves of a union of an intense strength. This is supported by three character-istics of love. Love is not always proportional to the dignity of the qualities which determine it. We are very often unable to find any quality that the beloved substance has. And love often does not cease when it is found that the be-loved does not have the quality that it originally was believed to have. This does not, however, mean that love is completely independent of the qualities that the beloved substance has and the qualities help in creating and destroy-ing the unity. But the more intense the consciousness of unity, the greater the love. This does not, however, mean that if one self loves another, then that self necessarily loves the original self back. But in absolute reality every self will love every other self. It is possible that B should love C and C should love D but does not love B. In which case B will perceive C ! D and will create an emotion of complacency toward C ! D. Similarly, B ! C ! D ! E will create an em-otion of complacency of B toward E. When a self loves another, this may be accompanied by feelings that they should be different or even that they should not exist. But there is always the desire that they should be there.
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Idealism Studies 